Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of Prevention Techniques by Grady, Kenneth A.




Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of
Prevention Techniques
Kenneth A. Grady
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the International Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Kenneth A. Grady, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of Prevention Techniques, 5 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 626 (1983-1984)
Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An
Overview of Prevention Techniques
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service in recent years has been particularly
concerned about third-country residents'1 use of bilateral income tax
treaties to avoid paying tax on United States source income.2 Although
third-country residents have benefited from United States bilateral in-
come tax treaties for more than twenty years, the loss of tax revenue
from such unintended use was not considered a major problem.3 The
recent proliferation of tax treaties between the United States and tax
havens4 which resulted in an increased loss of tax revenues, however,
I A "third-country resident" is an individual who is not a resident or citizen of the United
States or a country party to a tax treaty with the United States. Treasury Regulation § 1.871-2(b)
which defines "residence" for an individual provides: "an alien actually present in the United
States who is not a mere transient or sojourner is a resident of the United States for purposes of
the income tax." Treas. Reg. § 1.871-2(b) (1957). The term "third-country resident" should not be
confused with the term "nonresident alien individual," which includes those individuals who are
r9sidents or citizens of countries party to a tax treaty with the United States. Treas. Reg. § 1.871-
2(a) (1957).
2 The rules used to determine the source of income are set forth in I.R.C. §§ 861-864 (1981).
See also P. POSTLEWAITE, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATiON 11-46 (1982); P. POSTLEwArrE
& M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL TAXATION 20-84 (1982).
3 The first major case concerning treaty shopping, Aiken Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 925 (1971) acq. 1972-2 C.B. I, was not decided until more than thirty years after the United
States signed its first bilateral income tax treaty. See infra notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text.
4 Although there is no standard definition of a "tax haven," most definitions are similar to
one used by the Treasury Department: "any country having a low or zero rate of tax on all or
certain categories of income, and offering a certain level of banking or commercial secrecy." IRS,
TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS-AN OVERVIEW 14 (1981) [herein-
after cited as TAX HAVENS]. For investors interested in treaty shopping, three important charac-
teristics of a tax haven are a low tax rate, a well-developed banking system and a modem
communications system. Other important factors are secrecy laws, lack of currency controls and
the time zone in which the haven is located. See TAX HAVENS, supra at 15-20; M. LANGER & R.
POVELL, FOREIGN TAX HAVENS, 13 P.L.I. Tax Law & Prac. Trans. Ser. 1-22 (1973). One group
addressed this issue by stating:
There must be some "tax haven" element arising with respect to the other state. In some
instances, this may involve effective exemption from resident income tax in the other state.
An example of this would be the partial tax exemption allowed by certain Swiss cantons to
"domiciliary" companies not conducting business in Switzerland. Another example would be
the indirect foreign tax credit granted by the U.S. itself under I.R.C. § 902. In other in-
stances, the nature of the "tax haven" goes beyond effective exemption from resident income
tax to favorable withholding tax relief by the other state on onward transfers and
distributions.
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has caused the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to change its evaluation
of the treaty shopping problem. The inclusion of a thirty-two page sec-
tion on treaty shopping in a 1981 IRS report on tax havens is one indi-
cation that the IRS now considers third-country residents' abuse of
United States tax treaties a serious problem.5 The proliferation of tax
treaties with tax havens, along with the increasing availability of tax
advice for investors in the international arena, the large number of in-
vestors seeking countries with stable political and economic systems in
which to invest their funds, technological advances in communications,
and a growing international banking network have made treaty shop-
ping a game virtually any serious investor can play.6
The term "treaty shopping" stems from the practice of third-coun-
try residents searching for a country that has (1) a favorable income tax
treaty with the United States and (2) attractive internal tax laws.7 Once
the third-country resident investor has found such a country, income
from the United States may be channelled through a corporation or-
ganized under the laws of that country. The withholding tax rate on
New York State Bar Association, Tax Section, Committee on United States Activities of Foreign
Taxpayers, Report on Proposed United States ModelIncome Tax Treaty, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 219,
285 n.96 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Report on Proposed Treaty].
Many of the countries the IRS considers tax havens are present or former British territories.
Until recently, when a territory declared independence from the United Kingdom, it had the
option of agreeing to honor the terms of the United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty in
effect at the time of its declaration, or of terminating its obligations under the treaty. Countries
declaring their independence from Belgium were afforded the same opportunities.
Some of the tax havens which are presently developing income tax treaties with the United
States are Antigua-Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, and the Netherlands Antilles. The
United States recently cancelled 18 treaties which had come into effect by countries declaring their
independence from the United Kingdom or Belgium. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
5 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 156-88. The New York State Bar Association Committee also
has recognized "that treaty abuse is becoming an increasingly serious problem that deserves atten-
tion." Report on Proposed Treaty, supra note 4, at 284.
6 Undoubtedly, another important influence on the amount of treaty shopping is the growing
number of tax treaties. See Report on Proposed Treaty, supra note 4, at 220.
7 The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in its Report on the United States-Malta in-
come tax treaty, described treaty shopping as:
the situation where a person who is not a resident of either country a party to a treaty seeks
certain benefits under the income tax treaty between the two countries. Under certain cir-
cumstances, the nonresident is able to secure these benefits by establishing a corporation (or
other entity) in one of the countries which, as a resident of that country, is entitled to the
benefits under the treaty. Additionally, it may be possible for the third-country resident to
repatriate funds to the third country from the entity under favorable conditions (i.e., it may
be possible to reduce or eliminate taxes on the repatriation) either through relaxed tax provi-
sions in the distributing country or by passing the funds through other treaty countries (essen-
tially, continuing to treaty shop) until the funds can be repatriated under favorable terms.
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTrON WITH THE REPUB-
LIC OF MALTA, S. ExEc. REP. No. 30, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981), reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES
(CCH) 5435 at 5484.
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passive income under a tax treaty is usually less than the statutory
thirty percent rate8 applicable to residents of non-treaty countries, in
many cases completely exempting the income from taxation.9 Thus, by
redirecting his income flow through a tax treaty country, an investor
may significantly reduce the United States tax on his income.' 0 In ad-
dition, the laws of many tax treaty countries set low tax rates or, in
some cases, a rate of zero on dividends or interest paid to nonresident
investors." By channelling funds through the country with the most
favorable combination of tax treaty terms and internal tax laws (hence
the "shopping" label), a nonresident alien investor is able to avoid most
or all tax on United States source income.
12
8 I.R.C. § 871(a) (1976).
9 According to the New York State Bar Association Committee, this channelling procedure
regularly occurs with Canadian investments:
It is common knowledge, for example, that Canadian direct investment in the U.S. almost
invariably is made through Netherlands holding companies since the U.S. withholding tax on
dividends and interest paid to a Netherlands corporation (generally five percent and zero,
respectively.. .) is substantially less than the U.S. withholding tax on interest and dividends
paid to Canada (15% under the [1942 United States-Canada tax treaty]).
Report on Proposed Treaty, supra note 4, at 284-85 n.95.
10 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave an example of such a tax avoidance scheme
in its description of the tax treaty with Luxembourg, stating:
[I]f the convention were made applicable to Luxembourg holding companies, persons such as
[a] Bahamian resident would be encouraged to make U.S. investments through a Luxem-
bourg holding company so as to receive the benefit of the U.S. exemption from tax on interest
and royalty income, and the reduction of tax on dividend income, as well as the benefits of
article X(l) of the convention which insulates a resident of a third country from U.S. tax on
receipt of dividends from Luxembourg corporations by providing that the United States will
not tax the dividend or interest income of a resident of a third country which it received from
a Luxembourg corporation.
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., REPORT ON THE INCOME TAX CONVENTION BETWEEN
LUXEMBOURG AND THE UNITED STATES, S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted
in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 5348 at 5330.
11 For example, the Cayman Islands imposes no tax on payments to nonresident investors and
has no corporate income tax. ERNST & WHINNEY, FOREIGN AND U.S. CORPORATE INCOME AND
WITHHOLDING TAX RATES 4 (Dec. 1982).
12 See P. POSTLEWAITE & M. COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL TAXATION 226-27
(1982). For an excellent description of how third-country residents can benefit from the tax laws
of a treaty country, see Vogel, Bernstein & Nitsche, Inward Investments in Securities and Direct
Operations Through the British Virgin Islands: How Serious a Rival to the Netherlands Antilles
Island Paradise?, 34 TAX L. REv. 323 (1979). A description of the investment process with respect
to real property is set forth in Kanner, Advising the Foreign Investor in U.S. Real Estate: The
Netherlands Antilles Corporation, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 64 (1979). Kanner's discussion is affected by
the subsequent enactment of the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) as part
of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, §§ 1122-25 (codified in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.). Before FIRPTA, for example, a foreign investor in United States real property generally
paid tax only on the net income from that property. Kanner, supra at 65. Under FIRPTA, how-
ever, a foreign investor will have to pay capital gains tax on disposition of real property. I.R.C.
§ 897(1) (1981). FIRPTA contained a provision that it would not affect existing treaty provisions
until after 1984. I.R.C. § 897(i) (1981). The delay was not intended to encourage treaty shopping:
The delay in the effective date provisions was not intended to permit a foreign investor to
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While treaty shopping often encompasses instances of tax evasion
as well as tax avoidance, 13 this Comment focuses on legal forms of
treaty shopping and the present efforts of the United States government
to prevent abuse of bilateral income tax treaties by third-country
residents.
The United States is attempting to limit severely the practice of
treaty shopping through a two-pronged attack. First, Congress has re-
vised portions of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) which focus on the
investment activity of nonresident aliens. 4 By increasing the reporting
rearrange existing U.S. real estate investments so as to come under a treaty which would
exempt gain from the disposition of a [United States Real Property Interest] from tax under
FIRPTA. In the [Economic Recovery Tax Act] Conference Report, the conferees stated their
belief that most such restructuring transactions were prohibited under the broad power given
Treasury under I.RtC. § 897(e)(2) to adopt regulations to prevent tax avoidance. They felt
compelled, however, to emphasize the point in order to "avoid any misunderstandings."
Eigenbrode, Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax A ct of 1980, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 521, 542 (1982) (quoting THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, H.R. REp. No. 213,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 195, 281 (1981)). Section 897(i) was amended by Public Law No. 97-34,
§ 831(d) (1982), so that it now applies to dispositions after June 18, 1980 in tax years ending after
that date.
13 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 159-62. The focus of this Comment is on avoidance of
United States income taxes. A third-country resident who abuses a tax treaty also may be evading
or avoiding the taxes of the other contracting state. It is not easy to define what constitutes illegal
evasion and legal avoidance with respect to income taxes of United States treaty partners. For
example, Professor Huiskamp of Erasmus University Rotterdam states:
But what is "illegal"? This depends on the law-the national laws. What proves to be
against the law in country A, may be perfectly lawful in country B. So internationally we
cannot identify a transaction, a treatment, a circumstance that is from an international point
of view illegal.
Theoretically, of course, it is possible to work with abstract concepts which have interna-
tional validity. Scientifically the criterion of illegality may be formulated as the presence or
absence of deceit or falsity in the provision of information by the taxpayer or third person to
the tax authorities. We may also describe evasion without offering an exact definition: it may
be difficult to describe a donkey, but we recognise one when we see it. In this sense evasion
implies that the taxpayer fails to do something or does something wrong, for instance he gives
no information to the fisc. If we want to apply this definition or general description in prac-
tice, again, there is difficulty. Has the taxpayer, in a concrete case, a reporting obligation or
not?
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION PUBLICATION No.
31: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 19-20 (1981) (compendium of documents
from Colloquy of Mar. 5-7, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Colloquy].
14 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 336, reprinted in
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3, 307-08 (TEFRA); Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax
Act of 1980, § 1122, 26 U.S.C. § 897 (Supp. V 1981) (FIRPTA). One example of the tougher
provisions is the TEFRA amendment to subsection (a) of Section 7701 of the Code regarding
United States jurisdiction over foreign investors, which states:
If any citizen or resident of the United States does not reside in (and is not found in) any
United States judicial district, such citizen or resident shall be treated as residing in the Dis-
trict of Columbia for purposes of this title relating to-
(a) jurisdiction of courts, or
(b) enforcement of summons.
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(39) (1982). Another example is Section 982 of the Code concerning foreign docu-
mentation. Under Section 982:
629
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requirements for foreign investors, Congress gave the IRS tools to use
in identifying third-country resident investors and domestic investors
who are abusing United States bilateral tax treaties.'5
Second, since 1962 the Treasury Department has been attempting
to control treaty shopping through specific anti-treaty shopping articles
in tax treaties. 6 The Treasury Department currently is seeking in its
treaty negotiations with the British Virgin Islands 7 and the Nether-
[I]f a taxpayer fails to "substantially comply" with a "formal document request" arising out
of the tax treatment of any item, upon motion of the Secretary, any court having jurisdiction
over a civil proceeding in which the tax treatment of the examined item is at issue shall
prohibit the introduction into evidence by the taxpayer of any "foreign-based documenta-
tion" covered by such request unless such documentation was provided to the Secretary
within 90 days, or a later date to be set by the Secretary, of the mailing of the request.
H.R. REp. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 591, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
585. A taxpayer will not face a penalty if he refuses to comply based on "reasonable cause." The
possibility of a civil or criminal penalty being imposed by a foreign jurisdiction for disclosure of
the requested documentation will not be considered reasonable cause. Id at 592, 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. Naws at 586. It remains to be seen how helpful these new provisions will be to the
IRS since the issue of when a taxpayer has "substantially" complied has been left to the courts to
determine on a case-by-case basis.
15 H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 593-94, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 587-88. Prior to its revision of the Code compliance section, Congress had reacted to public
concern about increasing foreign investment in United States real property by passing the Foreign
Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA), supra note 12. See, e.g., SENATE COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIP-
PINES, S. ExEc. REP. No. 39, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PHILLIPINES RE-
PORT] ("substantial public and Congressional concern with Foreign investment in U.S. real estate
...led to the enactment of FIRPTA"). Prior to FIRPTA, a foreign investor in United States real
property would pay a small amount of tax on income from the property, and no tax on gain
realized upon disposition of the property. Following the enactment of FIRPTA, gain upon dispo-
sition of the property is subject to United States income tax. For a more complete description of
the effects of FIRPTA, see Feingold & Alpert, Observations on the Foreign Investment in Real
Property Tax Act of 1980, 1 VA. TAX REV. 105 (1981).
One purpose behind imposing a tax on gains from the disposition of real property held by
foreign investors and requiring foreign investors to disclose their holdings in certain types of real
property, see, e.g., Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, §§ 1-9, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-3508 (Supp. V 1981), was to equalize the tax treatment of foreign and domestic investors.
The congressional committee handling the bill stated the measure was not intended as "a penalty
on foreign investors or to discourage foreign investors from investing in the United States." S.
REP. No. 532, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1979); see also H.R. REP. No. 1150, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
170 (1980). An indirect benefit of these statutes might be a decrease in tax treaty abuse because
many foreign investors were investing in United States real property and channelling their invest-
ments through treaty countries to avoid disclosure and reporting requirements.
16 In 1962, the Treasury Department was able to include in the United States-Luxembourg
income tax treaty the first anti-treaty shopping article. The article was designed to limit the bene-
fits of the treaty to residents or citizens of the contracting states by excluding treaty benefits to
holding companies. Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Property, Dec. 18, 1962,
United States-Luxembourg, art. XV, 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726, reprinted in 1 TAX TREA-
TIES (CCH) 5303, 1 5318 [hereinafter cited as United States-Luxembourg Convention]. See also
infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
17 Recent events have highlighted the Treasury Department's efforts to stop treaty shopping
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lands Antilles,"3 both of which are tax havens, to include anti-treaty
shopping provisions in the new income tax treaties with those coun-
tries. Similar negotiations have begun with Antigua-Barbuda. 19 The
aggressive approach now being taken by the United States, 20 coupled
with the increasing number of developing countries desiring tax haven
status, indicates that the areas of international tax law governing treaty
shopping will experience change at a much faster pace over the next
few years.
Thus, the situation is ripe for addressing two questions. First,
and have focused national attention on the problem. On December 8, 1981, the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations voted to return a new United States-British Virgin Islands income tax
treaty to President Reagan for renegotiation on the grounds that it was potentially subject to abuse
by third-country residents. The Committee also voted to return for renegotiation a new income
tax treaty with Cyprus. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, RET URN OF Two TAX TRA-
TIES, S. ExEc. REP. No. 43, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON Two
TAX TREATIEs]. The tax treaties had been sent to the Senate for ratification as required by the
United States Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2. The Senate Committee recognized the po-
tential for abuse of these treaties, stating:
Both of these jurisdictions are tax havens. The pending treaties with both were designed to
prevent, or at least limit the extent to which residents of third countries can use these treaties,
in conjunction with favorable internal law provisions in those jurisdictions, to receive U.S.
treaty benefits. We have concluded, on the basis of our review of these treaties that the op-
portunities which potentially remain for such use are too great for us to tolerate. We intend
to raise our concerns with the Governments of both jurisdictions, and seek modifications in
these treaties consistent with our present policy.
REPORT ON Two TAX TREATias, supra at 2.
18 The Treasury Department, in October 1982, began negotiations for a new income tax treaty
with the Netherlands Antilles, a tax haven favored by both United States and foreign investors.
Fialka, Closing a Loophole Corporate Tax Haven In NetherlandsAntilles Is Bracingfor a Disaster,
Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (Midwest ed.). The Treasury Department lawyer heading the
United States negotiating team is quoted as saying: "As it stands, a treaty with the Netherlands
Antilles is a treaty with the world." Id at 1, col. 6. See also infra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text.
19 In November 1982, Antigua-Barbuda, a former United Kingdom colony announced that it
was cancelling its income tax treaty with the United States. Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 1, coL 5
(Midwest ed.). Antiguna-Barbuda became an independent country on November 1, 1981, and
since has been honoring the terms of the United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty which
was in effect at that time. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. Antigna-Barbuda is in the
process of revising its tax, banking and other investment laws to make the country a more attrac-
tive financial center.
20 Prior to 1970, Code changes affecting treaty shopping were infrequent and relatively minor.
The Code revisions were merely a temporary inconvenience for investors and international tax
lawyers, who were able to quickly circumvent the changes.
21 In July 1983, the Treasury Department announced that, effective January 1, 1984, it was
cancelling the tax treaties in effect between the United States and 18 former colonies of the United
Kingdom or Belgium. None of these treaties contained articles aimed at preventing treaty shop-
ping. The countries or territories whose treaties were cancelled are: Anguilla, Barbados, Belize,
Burundi, Dominica, the Falklands, Gambia, Grenada, Malawi, Montserrat, Rwanda, St. Christo-
pher, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Zaire and Zambia. Wall St. J., July 6, 1983,
at 1, col. 5 (Midwest ed.).
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what is the United States' current position regarding anti-treaty shop-
ping techniques as a result of past attempts by Congress and the Treas-
ury Department to prevent treaty shopping? And second, to what
extent will anti-treaty shopping measures thus far proposed, coupled
with the existing treaty provisions designed to limit treaty shopping, be
effective in preventing treaty shopping without impairing the United
States' efforts to achieve other goals through bilateral tax treaties?
These questions are especially relevant in view of Congress' recent
mandate to the Secretary of Treasury to develop procedures during the
next two years designed to "limit treaty benefits to those persons who
are justifiably entitled to such benefits."'22
The following discussion addresses the first question by analyzing
the development of anti-treaty shopping provisions in United States bi-
lateral tax treaties. This historical analysis demonstrates that the
Treasury Department has maneuvered the United States into a very
weak position from which to combat treaty shopping, by failing to
adopt and implement a consistent policy of including anti-treaty shop-
ping provisions in United States income tax treaties. The second ques-
tion is addressed by examining separately major anti-treaty shopping
proposals and determining how, if at all, each proposal should fit into a
coordinated attack on treaty shopping. Finally, this Comment con-
cludes that treaty shopping can be reduced to an acceptable level only
if the United States develops-and implements-a policy designed to
achieve equity among all countries with respect to treaty provisions
subject to abuse, so that the incentive to treaty shop is removed.
II. ANTI-TREATY SHOPPING PROVISIONS: EFFORTS TO CLOSE THE
MARKET DOOR
Although special concern about treaty shopping has developed rel-
atively recently, the possibility of treaty shopping has been acknowl-
edged since the United States entered its first major income tax treaty
with Sweden in 1939.23 This treaty with Sweden, and subsequent trea-
22 H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 593, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1365. An indication of Congress' concern about the impact of anti-treaty shopping provi-
sions is contained in the instructions to the Secretary of Treasury as to other factors which should
be considered in developing the provisions. These factors include:
the extent to which any procedures would prevent abuse, the administrability of such proce-
dures (including the ability of U.S. treaty partners to provide cooperation), any negative ef-
fect on investment in the U.S. by foreign persons which could be caused by increased costs of
complying with the procedures, and the effect on U.S. investment abroad should U.S. treaty
partners apply a similar method to that utilized by the United States.
Id See also REPORT ON Two TAX TREATIEs, supra note 17.
23 While the United States did have an income tax treaty with France for a brief period before
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ties with France, Canada and the United Kingdom,z4 were entered into
expressly to prevent "double taxation" and "fiscal evasion." Since the
United States taxes its citizens' income regardless of whether they are
residing in the United States or a foreign country at the time such in-
come is received,25 two problems may arise. First, a United States citi-
zen could have his income subjected to double taxation by having to
pay income taxes both to the foreign government (the income source)
and to the United States government.2 6 Alternatively, a citizen could
attempt to escape paying any United States tax on foreign source in-
come by simply failing to report the income to the IRS.27 The bilateral
income tax treaties were designed to prevent these tax consequences
1940, Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Apr. 27, 1932,
United States-France, 49 Stat. 3145, T.S. No. 885 (terminated), the first income tax treaty of any
significance was signed with Sweden in 1939, Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
Mar. 23, 1939, Additional Protocol, United States-Sweden, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958 (amended
Oct. 22, 1963), reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIEs (CCH) It 7305-28.
24 The 1939 treaty with Sweden, in addition to the 1939 treaty with France, Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, July 25, 1939, United States-France, 59
Stat. 893, T.S. No. 988 (replaced by new treaty July 28, 1967), and the 1942 treaty with Canada,
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Income, Mar. 4, 1942, United
States-Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983 (supplemented on June 12, 1950, Aug. 8, 1956, and Oct.
25, 1966. On Sept. 26, 1980 a new treaty was signed which, when it becomes effective will replace
the 1942 treaty.), reprinted in I TAX TREArrS (CCH) 11203, formed the basis for the 1945 treaty
with the United Kingdom, Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 16, 1945, United States-United King-
dom, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546 (supplemented May 25, 1954, Mar. 17, 1966, Aug. 19, 1957,
second convention Dec. 31, 1975), reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIEs (CCH) It 8106-29 [hereinafter
cited as United States-United Kingdom Convention]. The United States-United Kingdom Con-
vention (as amended) is important when considering treaty shopping because many of the present
tax havens are former British territories which adopted the effective terms of the United States-
United Kingdom treaty when they became independent. See infra note 35 and accompanying
text. For a brief description of the history of United States income tax treaties, see Rosenbloom &
Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy. An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 359, 360-69
(1981).
25 See I.R.C. § 61 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954) (legislative history defining statutory gross income as "all
inclusive"). For an exception to the general rule, see I.R.C. § 911(b)(2) (1982) (exempting from
tax certain foreign source income to United States citizens who meet the presence in foreign coun-
try test).
26 A United States citizen living in a foreign country, for example, could be subject to income
tax in that country on all income earned there. In addition, he or she would have to pay United
States income tax on that foreign source income. Although the Code contains a provision al-
lowing the United States citizen a credit on his or her United States income tax for foreign taxes
paid, I.R.C. § 901 (1982), if the foreign income tax exceeds the United States income tax, the
citizen will still be liable for the excess foreign tax.
27 Although an exact definition of "fiscal evasion" is very difficult, see supra note 13, the fol-
lowing definition will suffice for the purposes of this Comment: "Illegally paying less in taxes than
the law permits .. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (definition of "tax
evasion").
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through the use of devices such as reciprocal tax benefits 28 and disclo-
sure clauses.29
It was recognized by tax experts, however, that the income tax
treaties might create new opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion,
as well as eliminate tax avoidance and evasion possibilities. Such new
opportunities could arise from the imperfect fit of a particular treaty
with the laws of the United States, the other signatory country, or both
countries. A 1949 study of income tax treaties concentrating on treaties
between the United Kingdom and the United States, and between Ca-
nada and the United States, noted "[t]hat cooperation is needed partic-
ularly where the Convention itself may induce tax avoidance or
evasion, as in the application of tax exemptions which may encourage
taxpayers to retain contacts with the jurisdiction waiving the higher
tax."30 While there was at least limited recognition by some experts
that the treaties could create new avenues for tax avoidance, the Treas-
ury Department did not take any significant action to limit treaty bene-
fits to citizens or residents of the contracting countries until the 1962
United States-Luxembourg income tax treaty.31
In retrospect, the failure to include in tax treaties clauses limiting
benefits of the treaties to citizens or residents of the contracting states is
probably one of the major factors contributing to the existence of wide-
spread treaty shopping today. The importance of this omission is espe-
cially evident when considered in the context of the United States-
United Kingdom income tax treaty.32 While the income tax treaty be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom originally included
only Great Britain and Northern Ireland,33 the Convention was ex-
tended in 1959 to cover twenty British territories.34 In subsequent years,
28 An example of a provision relating to reciprocal tax benefits is Article 23, "Relief from
Double Taxation," contained in the Treasury Department's June 16, 1981 Model Income Tax
Treaty, art. 23, reprinted in IRS, TAX HAVEN INFORMATION BOOK 112, 121 (1982). See also Report
on the Proposed Treaty, supra note 14, at 305-10.
29 E.g., Treasury Department's June 16, 1981 Model Income Tax Treaty, supra note 28, art.
26. See also Report on the Proposed Treaty, supra note 4, at 313-16.
30 A. EHRENZWEIG & F. KOCH, INCOME TAX TREATIES 5-6 (1949).
31 United States-Luxembourg Convention, supra note 16.
32 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 24.
33 United States-United Kingdom Convention, supra note 24, at Introduction, 2 TAX TPEA-
TiES (CCH) 8103A.
34 Agreement Extending the Provisions of the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Aug. 19, 1957 and
Dec. 3, 1958, United States-United Kingdom, 9 U.S.T. 1459, T.I.A.S. No. 4141. The territories
included in the extension were: Aden, Antigua (now Antigua-Barbuda), Barbados, British Hon-
duras (now Belize), Cyprus, Dominica, Falkland Islands, Gambia, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat,
Nigeria (Federation of), Rhodesia and Nayasland (Federation of; Northern Rhodesia is now
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many of those territories declared themselves independent from the
United Kingdom. Most of these new countries agreed to continue hon-
oring the obligations and duties under the United States-United King-
dom income tax treaty existing at the time they declared
independence.35 Many of these new countries also passed laws making
them very attractive to investors-that is, tax havens.36
As former British territories became tax havens while still party to
income tax treaties which had been negotiated with a non-haven, the
United Kingdom, the United States found itself in an awkward posi-
tion. The new tax havens were not amenable to the inclusion of anti-
treaty shopping provisions in their treaties because such provisions
would reduce the income flow to their country. Of the twenty British
territories which were brought under the United States-United King-
dom income tax treaty in 1959, twelve were listed as tax havens in a
1981 IRS report.37 Since that report, two of the tax havens, the British
Virgin Islands (BVI) and Antigua-Barbuda, have begun to negotiate
with the Treasury Department to protect their tax haven status.3 8 The
disputes center on whether limitation of benefits provisions should be
included in their tax treaties, and if included, what form it should take.
In addition, the United States exercised its privilege to cancel the bilat-
eral tax treaties in effect with eighteen countries whose treaties arose
out of United States-United Kingdom and United States-Belgium tax
treaties, thereby taking the offensive against treaty shopping.39 Since
Zambia, Southern Rhodesia is Zimbabwe, and Nayasland is now Malawi), St. Christopher, Nevis
and Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago and the Vir-
gin Islands (known as the British Virgin Islands). Id at 1460-61.
35 Those countries which assumed the obligations of the United States-United Kingdom in-
come tax treaty in effect at the time they declared independence are: Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados,
Gambia, Grenada, Jamaica, Seychelles, Sierra Leone and Trinidad and Tobago.
36 Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada and Seychelles are classified as tax havens by the
IRS. TAx HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177.
37 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177. Those twelve countries are: Antigua-Barbuda, Barba-
dos, Belize (formerly British Honduras), British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Falkland Islands, Gre-
nada, Montserrat; St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla; St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Seychelles.
38 Fialka, supra note 18, at 14, col. 3; Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
39 See supra note 21. Article XXIV of the 1945 United States-United Kingdom Convention
stated:
The present Convention shall continue in effect indefinitely but either of the Contracting
Parties may, on or before the 30th day of June in any year after the year 1946, give to the
other Contracting Party, through diplomatic channels, notice of termination and, in such
event, the present Convention shall cease to be effective ....
Art. XXIV, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. No. 1546. Article 17 of the 1966 Protocol amended Article
XXIV by changing the date after which the treaty could be terminated to June 30, 1966. Income
Tax Protocol, Mar. 17, 1966, United States-United Kingdom, 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No. 6089.
A new Convention was signed by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1975. Conven-
tion for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
635
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:626(1983)
the number of investors and the amount of funds affected by the can-
cellations were rather small,4° whereas the potential for abusing the
treaties was great, the Treasury Department acted wisely by cancelling
the treaties.4'
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TREATY PROVISIONS
LIMITING BENEFITS: 1960-1964
A. Luxembourg Treaty and the Netherlands Antilles Protocol
On December 18, 1962, the United States signed an income tax
treaty with Luxembourg.42 This treaty was the first to contain an arti-
Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, United States-United Kingdom, - U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 9682, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 8103A. Article 29 of the 1975 Conven-
tion provides that the Convention may be terminated by either of the Contracting Parties after
June 30, 1980. Art. 29, 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5691, T.I.A.S. No. 9682.
40 See, e.g., TAX HAvENs, supra note 4, at 151.
41 Cancelling United States income tax treaties with former British territories had been sug-
gested in a report by the IRS: "The United States should consider terminating its existing tax
haven treaties, particularly those with the Netherlands Antilles and the former United Kingdom
territories. The United Kingdom extensions are an affront to sound tax administration, existing
only to be abused." TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 170. At least one commentator, however, has
stated that cancelling the treaties would not be in the best interests of the United States:
Without treaties with tax havens, the United States would have no access to information on
tax haven transactions such as non-reporting of illegally earned income and cash "launder-
ing." The cancellation of tax treaties would therefore merely shift the problem from one of
tax avoidance to tax evasion, a practice more difficult to detect and eliminate. In addition,
cancellation of treaties could have undesired diplomatic consequences, particularly since
many well-known tax haven treaty partners are colonies of close U.S. allies. Finally, cancel-
lation of such treaties would interfere with legitimate fiscal relations between treaty partners,
and would reduce the flow of investment from bona fide haven residents into the United
States.
Comment, Renegotiation of the United States-British Virgin Islands Tax Convention: Prelude to the
End of Treaty Shopping?, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 381, 409 (1982). These arguments, however, are not
convincing. First, it is not clear that taxpayers who have been legally avoiding United States
income taxes would immediately shift to illegally evading United States income taxes upon can-
cellation of the treaties. While there undoubtedly will be some increase in tax evasion, if these
revenues lost through the tax evasion are less than the increase in revenues from taxpayers who
can no longer avoid taxes, then the maneuver will have been economically worthwhile, at least in
the short run. Second, it is unlikely any major negative diplomatic consequences will arise. The
United States has not refused to have treaties which cannot be abused. Any close United States
allies which were connected with tax haven countries would have a difficult argument to make in
favor of tax treaties which can be abused. United States' allies interest in the treaties would arise
primarily from the fact that their residents had been channelling funds through these tax havens to
avoid the treaties between the allies and the United States. Thus, an ally would have to under-
mine its own restrictive treaty in order to support the tax haven. A recent colloquy sponsored by
the Council of Europe suggests United States allies also are not in favor of treaty shopping and,
therefore, would not rush to support the tax havens. Colloquy, supra note 13. Finally, the flow of
funds from bona fide residents of the tax havens into the United States is presumably so small that
a temporary disruption while the treaties are being renegotiated is not sufficiently serious to out-
weigh the immediate benefits from preventing treaty abuse. See Comment, supra at 389 n.38.
42 United States-Luxembourg Convention, supra note 16.
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cle specifically aimed at limiting benefits under the treaty to those per-
sons who were citizens or residents of one of the contracting states.43
Article 15 provided that "[t]he present Convention shall not apply to
the income of any holding company entitled to any special tax benefit
under Luxembourg Law... or to any income derived from such com-
panies by any shareholder thereof."'  Holding companies were
thought to be the primary device through which residents of countries
with low or nonexistent income tax rates would channel income to
avoid paying the United States thirty percent tax on passive income-
that is, dividends, interest, and royalties. 45 As the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee stated in its report on the treaty:
[I]f income were received by a Luxembourg holding company whose
shareholders reside in a third country, and the provisions of this conven-
tion were made applicable to such companies, it would be possible for
interest and royalty income to be completely exempt from tax in the
United States, in Luxembourg, and also in the country of residence of the
corporate shareholder if the third country in which the shareholder re-
sides does not have an income tax. Moreover, the reduced U.S. tax rate
on dividend would be the sole tax burden on dividend income.
46
Article 15 remedied this situation by excluding Luxembourg holding
companies from the treaty benefits, thereby subjecting holding compa-
43 United States-Luxembourg Convention, supra note 16, art. 15. Article 15 states:
The present Convention shall not apply to the income of any holding company entitled to
any special tax benefit under Luxembourg Law of July 31, 1929, and Decree Law of Decem-
ber 27, 1937, or under any similar law subsequently enacted, or to any income derived from
such companies by any shareholder thereof. In the event that substantially similar benefits
are granted to other corporations under any law enacted by Luxembourg after the date of
signature of the present Convention, the provisions of the present Convention shall not apply
to the income of any such corporation or to any income derived from such corporation by any
shareholder thereof. The expression "substantially similar benefits" shall be deemed not to
include tax reduction or exemption granted to any corporation in respect of dividends derived
from another corporation, 25 percent or more of the stock of which is owned by the recipient
corporation.
44Id
45 I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (1976). Section 871 states:
There is hereby imposed for each taxable year a tax of 30 percent of the amount received
from sources within the United States by a nonresident alien individual as
(A) interest (other than original issue discount as defined in section 1232(b)), dividends,
rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emolu-
ments, and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and in-
come...
46 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INCOME TAX CONVENTION BE-
TWEEN LUXEMBOUtRG AND THE UNITED STATES, S. EXEc. REP. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 5348 at 5329. In an example contained in the report, Ba-
hama (another favorite tax haven) was used to demonstrate how a third-country which had no
income tax could serve as a base for investors taking advantage of a United States income tax
treaty. If there had been no exemption for holding companies in the Luxembourg treaty, Bahami-
ans would have been able to invest in the United States through a Luxembourg holding company
and pay no income tax to the United States. Id at 5329-30.
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nies to the thirty percent tax on passive income.47
Two issues noted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-
port on the Luxembourg treaty indicate why the limitations article
failed to prevent treaty shopping. These issues also have become recur-
ring considerations in the Treasury Department's attempts to stop
treaty shopping. The first issue concerns a basic tenet of tax treaty ne-
gotiation: The longer a country has enjoyed tax haven status and a
liberal tax treaty, the more difficult it becomes from a political stand-
point to curtail the scope of tax avoidance activities in that country.48
The report stated, however, that the use of Luxembourg holding com-
panies to receive income from the United States had not been wide-
spread before the treaty; consequently, excluding holding companies
from the treaty would not "significantly affect the U.S. balance-of-pay-
ments position.
49
The second, and more important issue raised in the report was that
inclusion of the holding company exemption in the United States-Lux-
embourg treaty made it inconsistent with the United States-Nether-
lands Antilles Protocol.5 0 The Protocol did not contain a provision
regarding "secondary liability," generally defined as dividend and in-
terest payments of a holding company to its shareholders. 1 Under Ar-
ticle 15 of the Luxembourg treaty, Luxembourg holding companies or
their shareholders could not take advantage of any tax benefits flowing
from the treaty. 2 Under the terms of the United States-Netherlands
47 See supra notes 43 & 45.
48 See PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 15.
49 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10. United States tax laws affect the
United States balance-of-payments position by varying the incentives for investors to keep or
bring capital into the United States; or alternatively, to keep or send capital out of the United
States. As the capital flow out of the United States increases relative to the capital flow into the
United States, the United States balance-of-payments position moves further in the direction of a
deficit. A relative increase of capital flowing into the United States moves the balance-of-pay-
ments position towards a surplus. Thus, any tax law or treaty provision which would make for-
eign investment in the United States unfavorable should be avoided if the United States wants to
protect its balance-of-payments position. Because there had been very little investment in the
United States through Luxembourg holding companies, a treaty provision denying tax advantages
for funds invested through such holding companies would have only a slight negative effect on the
capital flow into the United States. The Senate Committee did not believe the slight decrease in
capital flow would significantly affect the United States balance-of-payments position. Id
50 Income Tax Protocol, Oct. 23, 1963, United States-Netherlands Antilles, 15 U.S.T. 1900,
T.I.A.S. No. 5665.
51 For a more complete definition of secondary liability in the context of holding companies,
see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INCOME TAX CONVENTION BE-
TWEEN LUXEMBOURG AND THE UNITED STATES, S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 5348 at 5330.
52 See supra note 43.
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Antilles Protocol of 1963, however, only holding companies-not the
holding companies' shareholders-were precluded from taking advan-
tage of the treaty benefits.53 Thus, the secondary liability payments
were eligible for treaty benefits. Noting this difference between the
treaty and the Protocol, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pro-
vided an explanation in its report:
Although it would be consistent with the approach taken in the pending
Luxembourg Convention to make Article XII of the convention with the
Netherlands inapplicable in the case of dividends paid by Netherlands
Antilles corporations to nonresident shareholders, to do so could cause an
adverse effect on the U.S. balance-of-payments position. Since it is esti-
mated that a large portion of the assets held by Netherlands Antilles cor-
porations (estimated at approximately $1 billion) is held by corporations
which derive 50 percent or more of their gross income from sources
within the United States, it is feared that repeal of Article XII could cause
a substantial liquidation of U.S. assets held by these corporations so as to
avoid the statutory 50-percent rule which would be applicable in the ab-
sence of the present convention.
54
While the Senate Committee could only speculate as to the effects, if
any, of the difference between the treaties, viewed from a current per-
spective, it is evident that treaty shopping continued. Third-country
resident shareholders were, in effect, encouraged to make investments
through the Netherlands Antilles and to steer away from investments
through Luxembourg. A 1981 IRS study on tax havens, which lists the
Netherlands Antilles third in terms of United States gross income paid
to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations during 1978, supports
this contention. 5 Although Luxembourg is listed fourth in this study,
only one behind the Netherlands Antilles, comparison of the gross in-
come figures reveals a substantial gap between the two. Luxembourg
received $21,066,000 in United States gross income, whereas the
Netherlands Antilles received $190,759,000 5 6-- more than eight times
53 Income Tax Protocol, Oct. 23, 1963, United States-Netherlands Antilles, art. I, 15 U.S.T.
1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665.
54 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE
UNrrED STATES AND THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES, S. Exac. REP. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
44, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) % 5856 at 5839-9.
55 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177.
56 Sixteen countries are listed by the IRS as tax havens: Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Belize,
British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Falkland Islands, Grenada, Luxembourg, Montserrat, Nether-
lands, Netherlands Antilles, St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla; St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Sey-
chelles, and Switzerland. TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177. Of those countries, Luxembourg is
fourth in terms of total United States gross income paid to nonresident aliens and foreign corpora-
tions in tax haven countries during 1978. The total United States gross income paid to nonresi-
dent aliens and foreign corporations in Luxembourg during 1978 was a total of $21,066,000
($14,195,000 in dividends, $5,968,000 in interest, and $904,000 in other payments). Id at 177.
Because Luxembourg had a population of only 360,000 in 1978, NEWSPAPER ENTERPRISE Assocl-
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the amount received by Luxembourg. While, undoubtedly, there are
many factors which contribute to this extreme difference, one impor-
tant factor is the inconsistency between the treaty provisions limiting
benefits. Almost by definition, treaty shopping occurs when there are
differences among the treaties as to their effect on nonresident alien
income.
B. Sweden
A Supplementary Convention with Sweden, also signed in the
early 1960s, updated many of the provisions in the United States-Swe-
den income tax treaty.57 The Convention changed the tax rates on divi-
dends and interest flowing between the United States and Sweden, but
did not add an exclusion covering holding companies. There was no
explanation in the Senate Finance Committee report on the Supple-
mentary Convention about why a limitation of benefits article was not
included in the agreement. 58 Since Sweden was not recognized gener-
ally as an attractive tax haven, one possible explanation for not includ-
ing such an article is that it would have become applicable only if
Sweden changed its internal tax laws so as to become a tax haven. The
fact that such a change was unlikely, and indeed did not occur, could
have been an incentive to leave such an article out of the negotiating
documents and thereby reduce the number of controversial items.
Moreover, the United States may have been assuming that if Sweden
did move to become a tax haven, a restrictive article could be added to
the treaty. The fallacy of such a position, however, should have been
ATION, INC., WORLD ALMANAC 556 (1980), it appears that the payments were not solely for the
benefit of citizens and residents of Luxembourg, but also for residents of other countries. Id at
150.
57 Supplementary Convention Relating to Income and Other Taxes, Oct. 23, 1963, United
States-Sweden, 15 U.S.T. 1824, T.I.A.S. No. 5656.
58 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN, S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 53,
reprintedin 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) I 7351B. The Technical Memorandum of the Treasury De-
partment concerning the treaty, however, notes that the Sweden treaty approached the double
taxation problem differently than the United States tax treaty with the Netherlands. The Treasury
Department stated:
The approach to avoidance of double taxation thus adopted differs from that employed in the
Netherlands convention in that in the latter convention outright exemption from taxation in
one or the other of the two contracting states was provided with respect to items of income
such as royalties, income from real property, Government salaries and compensations, pri-
vate pensions, and life annuities.
Id at 7329. The Netherlands treaty, therefore, encouraged third-country residents to form hold-
ing companies in the Netherlands to receive income from the United States tax free. Because the
treaty with Sweden did not provide a tax exemption, there was less of an incentive to form a
Swedish holding company, and therefore less need to exempt holding companies from the treaty.
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evident to the Treasury Department from the difficulty it had encoun-
tered while negotiating the inclusion of a limitations article in the
Netherlands Antilles Protocol of 196311 and from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee's warnings regarding the Luxembourg treaty.
60
The Treasury Department eventually did adopt the position that limi-
tations articles are to be included in new treaties,61 and it is now faced
with the monumental task of getting a limitations article incorporated
into treaties with tax havens.
C. Japan
Other examples of Treasury Department actions inconsistent with
the anti-treaty shopping provision of the Luxembourg treaty were the
1954 United States income tax treaty with Japan and the later Protocol
between the same countries.6 2 As was customary for the period, no
provision was included to limit benefits under the 1954 treaty. In Au-
gust 1962, the two countries signed a Protocol which updated several
articles of the treaty,63 particularly those concerning dividends64 and
interest.65  The Protocol, however, also did not include any article to
limit benefits, and no reason was given in the Senate report on the Pro-
tocol as to why there was such an omission.6 6 Because Japan, like Swe-
den, was not considered a tax haven when the Protocol was signed, and
presently is not classified as a tax haven by the IRS,67 it is likely the
Treasury Department followed the same logic hypothesized in the pre-
vious section concerning the Sweden Protocol, in not negotiating for an
article to limit benefits in the Japan treaty or Protocol.
59 See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
60 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61 See infra text accompanying notes 75-98.
62 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 16, 1954, United States-Japan, 6 U.S.T. 150, T.I.A.S. No.
3176, reprinted in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 4403.
63 Protocol Modifying and Supplementing the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Aug. 14, 1962, United States-Japan, 16 U.S.T. 697,
T.I.A.S. No. 5798, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 4472 at 4411-5.
64 Id, art. III, 16 U.S.T. at 699, T.I.A.S. No. 5798, reprintedin 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 114472
at 4411-5.
65 Id, art. IV, 16 U.S.T. at 700, T.I.A.S. No. 5798, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 4472
at 4411-5.
66 See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE PROTOCOLS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN MODIFYING AND SUPPLEMENTING THE 1954 INCOME TAX CONVEN-
TION, S. ExEc. REP. No. 10, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) I 4473A.
67 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:626(1983)
IV. A PERIOD OF OMISSION: 1965-1969, TAx TREATIES WITHOUT
LIMITATIONS ARTICLES
During the period 1965 to 1969, the United States signed seven
income tax treaties with different nations.6" None of these agreements
contained an article specifically dealing with the limitation of benefits
under the applicable treaties. In retrospect, the failure to include such
an article in any of the treaties was a major omission by the Treasury
Department. If the Treasury Department was operating with the belief
that a limitation of benefits article should be included only when it was
very likely the treaty would be abused, then this omission is under-
standable, although not excusable. Of the seven countries with which
agreements were signed during this period,69 only the Netherlands was
listed by the IRS in 1981 as a tax haven.70
While the Treasury Department chose not to negotiate for the in-
clusion of articles limiting benefits, all of the agreements negotiated
during the 1950s and 1960s provided excellent opportunities for refin-
ing a limitation of benefits article.71 Since most of the countries in-
68 Protocol, May 21, 1965, United States-Belgium, 17 U.S.T. 1142, T.I.A.S. No. 6073, reprinted
in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 642A; Protocol, Sept. 17, 1965, United States-Germany, 16 U.S.T.
1875, T.I.A.S. No. 5920, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 3025; Supplementary Convention,
Dec. 30, 1965, United States-Netherlands, 17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6051, reprinted in 2 TAX
TREATIES (CCH) T 5856C; Supplementary Protocol, Mar. 17, 1966, United States-United King-
dom, 17 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. No. 6089, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) T 8131A; Supplemen-
tary Convention, Oct. 25, 1966, United States-Canada, 18 U.S.T. 3186, T.I.A.S. No. 6415, reprinted
in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1262; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Dec. 22, 1966, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, 18 U.S.T. 3091,
T.I.A.S. No. 6400, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 7603 (terminated Dec. 31, 1969); Con-
vention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion,
July 28, 1967, United States-France, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.I.A.S. No. 6518, reprinted in 1 TAX TREA-
TIES (CCH) % 2803.
69 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United
Kingdom. See supra note 69.
70 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177.
71 Such an article, interacting with other treaty articles relating to dividends, interest and roy-
alties would operate in a way so as to severely limit treaty shopping. For example, Article 16 of
the Treasury Department's June 16, 1981 Model Income Tax Treaty states:
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a Contracting State shall
not be entitled under this Convention to relief from taxation in the other Contracting State
unless
(a) more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest in such person is owned, directly or
indirectly, by one or more individual residents of the first-mentioned Contracting State; and
(b) the income of such person is not used in substantial part, directly or indirectly, to
meet liabilities (including liabilities for interest or royalties) to persons who are residents of a
State other than a Contracting State and who are not citizens of the United States.
For the purposes of subparagraph (a), a company that has substantial trading in its stock on a
recognized exchange in a Contracting State is presumed to be owned by individual residents
of that Contracting State.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply if it is determined that the acquisition or maintenance of
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volved were not tax havens and were not intent on becoming tax
havens, they would not have been threatened by the inclusion of such
an article. In addition, a limitation of benefits article would not have
seriously affected the cash flow between the United States and any of
the other contracting states. These other states were not tax havens,
therefore there would not have been a balance-of-payments problem.
The most significant loss from the Treasury Department's failure
during this period to negotiate for inclusion of limitation of benefits
articles was the wasted opportunity to develop a model article. The
United States has attempted to improve its treaty development process
by using past agreements as models for subsequent agreements con-
cerning the same issues.7 2 A limitation of benefits article developed
during this period and included in all treaty agreements would have
served as a functional model for the Treasury Department in its negoti-
ations with tax havens.
A highly effective limitations article could have resulted from the
process of developing a model article and then negotiating for its inclu-
sion in tax treaties. The more effective the article developed, the more
benefit the Treasury Department would derive from having the fore-
sight to engage in the development process. In addition, the Treasury
Department could have strenthened its negotiating position regarding
inclusion of such an article in treaties with tax havens if the Depart-
ment already had included such articles in all other treaties. Tax haven
countries are apt to be more resistant to an article which will be in-
cluded only in their treaties than an article which is a standard part of
every United States income tax treaty.
It may be argued that the above criticisms of the Treasury Depart-
ment's treaty negotiation plan are of academic, but little practical,
value. They are especially relevant, however, as the Treasury Depart-
ment now enters another period of extensive negotiations for income
tax treaties.73
such person and the conduct of its operations did not have as a principal purpose obtaining
benefits under the Convention.
3. Any relief from tax provided by a Contracting State to a resident of the other Con-
tracting State under the Convention shall be inapplicable to the extent that, under the law in
force in that other State, the income to which the relief relates bears significantly lower tax
than similar income arising within that other State derived by residents of that other State.
Reprinted in IRS, TAx HAVEN INFORMATION BOOK 112 (1982). The Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) also has a model tax treaty but it does not contain a
comparable article. See I TAx TREATIs (CCH) 151.
72 See generally, Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 24.
73 For example, the Treasury Department presently is renegotiating the Netherlands Antilles
treaty, and the British Virgin Islands treaty has been withdrawn from consideration by the Presi-
dent so that it may be renegotiated. See supra note 17.
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V. AN OVERVIEW OF TREATY PROVISIONS LIMITING BENEFITS
Treaties signed in the 1970s evidence the Treasury Department's
renewed concern about treaty shopping. In its attempt to find a model
article which will effectively prevent treaty shopping, the Treasury De-
partment has employed and revised many versions of Article 16, the
"Investment or Holding Companies" article.74
A. Trinidad and Tobago
Article 16 first appeared in the United States-Trinidad and To-
bago income tax treaty signed January 9, 1970. 75 Article 16 stated:
A corporation of one of the Contracting States deriving dividends, in-
terest, or royalties from sources within the other Contracting State shall
not be entitled to the benefits of Article 12 (Dividends), 13 (Interest), or 14
(Royalties) if-
(a) By reason of special measures granting tax benefits to investment
or holding companies the tax imposed on such corporation by the first-
mentioned Contracting State with respect to such dividends, interest, or
royalties is substantially less than the tax generally imposed by such
Contracting State on corporate profits, and,
(b) Twenty-five percent or more of the capital of such corporation is
held of record or is otherwise determined, after consultation between
the competent authorities of the Contracting States, to be owned, di-
rectly or indirectly, by one or more persons who are not residents of the
first-mentioned Contracting State (or, in the case of a Trinidad and To-
bago corporation, who are citizens of the United States).76
74 See, e.g., Treasury Department's June 16, 1981 Model Income Tax Treaty, Article 16, supra
note 72. One commentator has noted that it would be more appropriate to name this article:
"Limitation on Treaty Benefits." Report on Proposed Treaty, supra note 4, at 289 n.98.
75 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion,
Jan. 9, 1970, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047, reprinted in 2
TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 7608 [hereinafter cited as United States-Trinidad and Tobago
Convention].
76 Id, 22 U.S.T. at 180, T.I.A.S. No. 7047, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) T 7624. A new
income tax treaty between the United States and Finland was signed on March 6, 1970. It also
contained Article 16, but with a few minor changes in wording. Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation of Income and Property and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Mar. 6, 1970,
United States-Finland, 22 U.S.T. 40, T.I.A.S. No. 7042, reprinted in 1 TAX TREATIES (CCH)
2651 at 2669 (Article 27). For other treaties containing similar articles, see Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-
Norway, 23 U.S.T. 2832, T.I.A.S. No. 7474, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) T 6053 at 6075
(Article 20); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Eva-
sion, May 7, 1975, United States-Republic of Iceland, 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 8151, reprinted
in I TAX TREATIES (CCH) 3703 at 3721 (Article 27); Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, June 4, 1976, United States-Republic of Korea, 30
U.S.T. 5253, T.I.A.S. No. 9506, reprinted in 1 TAX TRYEATIES (CCH) 1 4803 at 4818 (Article 17);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Aug. 1,
1977, United States-Morocco, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10194, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES
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Trinidad and Tobago is a former British territory included in the
1958 agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom.7
That agreement extended benefits of the income tax treaty between
those countries to British territories, and became effective for Trinidad
and Tobago as of January 1, 1959.78 On August 31, 1962, Trinidad and
Tobago became an independent nation;79 it agreed, however, to honor
the articles of the United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty
which were in effect at that time.80 On January 1, 1966, the United
States treaty with Trinidad and Tobago was terminated, the govern-
ment of Trinidad and Tobago having revoked its agreement to the
treaty.8" A limited income tax treaty between the two countries was
signed on December 22, 1966,82 and it continued in force from Decem-
ber 19, 1967 until December 31, 1969.83 The present income tax treaty
between the countries which includes the "Investment or Holding
Company" article became effective December 30, 1970.84
(CCH) 5603 at 5519 (Article 24); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Aug. 24, 1980, United States-Arab Republic of Egypt, - U.S.T. -,
T.I.A.S. No. 10149, reprinted in 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 8005 at 8021 (Article 24).
On October 1, 1976 the United States signed a proposed income tax treaty with the Republic
of the Philippines, the first such treaty between the two countries. Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Oct. 1976, United States-Republic of
the Philippines, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 6603. In its
report on the treaty, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations expressed concern that there was
no anti-treaty shopping provision in the treaty:
While we understand that the Philippines treaty does not offer any present abuse pos-
sibilities, such possibilities may develop later. It has proved difficult to renegotiate treaties
once abuses develop. Also, there is no reason why an anti-abuse provision was not included
in this treaty.
The tax legislation writing committees have indicated concern with treaties that lack
anti-abuse provisions, and this Committee shares that concern. The Committee could have
recommended delaying ratification until an anti-abuse provision acceptable to the Senate was
negotiated or it could have recommended a reservation. However, the Committee believes
that ratification of this treaty is overdue and recognizes that a reservation could delay ratifica-
tion by the Philippines. The Committee, however, requests the Treasury Department to ne-
gotiate an anti-abuse provision that follows the provision in the current US. model.
PHILIPPINES REPORT, supra note 15, at 9.
77 See supra note 32.
78 Id
79 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 7602 at 7603.
80 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion,
Dec. 22, 1966, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, 18 U.S.T. 3091, T.I.A.S. No. 6400, reprinted in
2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 7608.
81 2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 1 7602 at 7603.
82 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion,
Dec. 22, 1966, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, 18 U.S.T. 3091, T.I.A.S. No. 6400, reprinted in
2 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 7603.
83 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1 7602 at 7603.
84 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion,
Jan. 9, 1970, United States-Trinidad and Tobago, 22 U.S.T. 164, T.I.A.S. No. 7047, reprinted in 2
TAX TREATIES (CCH) 7608. The history of the Trinidad and Tobago income tax treaty, when
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:626(1983)
The Treasury Department chose to reverse its policy of not includ-
ing limitations articles in treaties, by including such an article in the
1970 tax treaty with Trinidad and Tobago. The report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee concerning that treaty85 contains no di-
rect explanation as to why Article 16 was included. In portions of the
report concerning other sections of the treaty, however, the Committee
expressed concern about certain issues which may have prompted the
Treasury Department to negotiate for inclusion of Article 16. In partic-
ular, the Committee disclosed that it did not want to include provisions
in the treaty which would "provide a tax incentive for increasing the
flow of technology from the United States to Trinidad and Tobago." 6
The Committee believed it was not appropriate to encourage American
investment abroad at a time when the United States was facing severe
domestic problems and a balance-of-payments deficit. 87 As noted pre-
viously, the balance-of-payments problem was the major reason for not
including secondary liabilities in the article excluding benefits to hold-
ing companies under the United States-Netherlands Antilles income
tax protocol signed October 23, 1963.88 It is interesting to contrast,
then, how Congress has viewed Article 16 as a tool for controlling the
United States balance-of-payments position. The Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee argued that inclusion in the Netherlands Antilles
treaty of an "Article 16" incorporating secondary liability would nega-
tively affect the United States balance-of-payments position by de-
creasing the flow of funds from United States investors to the
Netherlands Antilles. When the treaty with Trinidad and Tobago was
negotiated, however, the Committee took the position thatfailure to in-
clude an Article 16 incorporating secondary liability would negatively
viewed in the context of treaty shopping, highlights many points important to the issue of treaty
shopping in general. First, as noted before, supra note 34 and accompanying text, many of the
present tax havens which are party to an income tax treaty with the United States were British
territories. Second, although not an absolute rule, most of the former British territories agreed to
honor the articles of the United States-United Kingdom income tax treaty in effect at the time the
territories became independent nations. See supra note 33. Third, many of these nations subse-
quently terminated their assumed income tax treaty with the United States: namely, Antigua-
Barbuda, Cyprus, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. Of these countries, the last three recently
have negotiated new tax treaties with the United States and Antigua-Barbuda currently is negoti-
ating a new tax treaty. Finally, Trinidad and Tobago is one of the few former British territories
which presently is not classified by the IRS as a tax haven. TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177-78.
85 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, S. ExEc. REP. No. -, - Cong., - Sess. -, re-
printed in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 117656.
86 Id at -, 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 7656 at 7632.
87 Id
88 Protocol, Oct. 23, 1963, United States-Netherlands, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665, re-
printed in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 5832B. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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affect the United States balance-of-payments position.8 9 With respect
to the Trinidad and Tobago treaty, one of the goals was to limit the
flow of funds out of the United States. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee had become very concerned about any provisions in United
States income tax treaties which could draw significant amounts of
funds away from the United States. As the Committee stated:
[T]his reservation [to exclude the tax incentive] will not preclude further
consideration by the Committee and the Senate of the concept of provid-
ing investment tax incentives in bilateral agreements. It does, however,
have the effect of putting the Administration on notice that such a concept
will not be approved until our domestic and international economic and
political situations show a marked improvement. 90
The Treasury Department was somewhat more explicit than the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning why Article 16 was
included in the Trinidad and Tobago treaty. The brief description fo-
cused on the purpose of Article 16 as a means of preventing "the poten-
tial abuse which could occur if one of the States provided preferential
rates of tax for investment or holding companies." 91 This explanation
does not, however, shed any light on why the Treasury Department
believed it was necessary to begin including such articles in treaties ne-
gotiated in the 1970s. In any event, the inclusion of Article 16 in the
United States-Trinidad and Tobago income tax treaty marked the be-
ginning of a new era in the Department's approach to preventing treaty
shopping.
B. Jamaica
One of the most recent developments resulting from the United
States' efforts to incorporate anti-treaty shopping provisions in bilateral
tax treaties is the new tax treaty with Jamaica signed on May 21,
1980.92 The limitation of benefits provision, included in the treaty as
89 The Senate Committee's contradictory positions regarding inclusion of Article 16 in these
treaties highlights one of the fundamental problems involved in negotiating tax treaties. Because
the treaties are used to implement fiscal policies as well as tax policies, a conflict may arise be-
tween the policy approaches of each area. While the Senate resolved the conflict in this case by
favoring a consistent position on the balance-of-payments issue, it did so at the expense of a
consistent tax policy.
90 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 86, at -, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES
(CCH) 7656 at 7632-33.
91 Technical Explanation by Treasury Department, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 1
7655 at 7626-27.
92 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion,
May 21, 1980, United States-Jamaica, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10206, rrinted in 2 TAX TREA-
7iEs (CCH) 4386, amended by Protocol, July 17, 1981, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10207, re-
printed in 2 TAx TREATIEs (CCH) 4387D.
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Article 17, is the most restrictive the Treasury Department has ever
included in an income tax treaty. Prior limitation provisions had fo-
cused on excluding benefits to third-country residents by limiting treaty
benefits to those residents of a contracting state who met an ownership
requirement. In the peculiar negative inference language used by the
Treasury Department in the United States treaty with Trinidad and
Tobago:
A corporation of one of the Contracting States ... shall not be entitled to
the benefits [of the treaty concerning dividends, interest or royalties] if-
(b) twenty-five percent or more of the capital of such corporation is held
of record or is otherwise determined to be owned . . . by one or more
persons who are not residents of the first-mentioned Contracting State.
94
Article 17 of the Jamaica treaty significantly stiffens the test by
raising the requisite ownership level to seventy-five percent or more.
Article 17 states:
1. A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of a Con-
tracting State shall not be entitled under this Convention to relief from
taxation in the other Contracting State unless
(a) more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest in such person is
owned, directly or indirectly, by one or more individual residents of the
first-mentioned Contracting State.
95
The treaty with Jamaica clearly represents an attitude in the
Treasury Department to "get tough" on the issue of treaty shopping.
This new attitude, however, does not necessarily mean.that the end of
treaty shopping is near. Only two other treaties have been negotiated
which include provisions as restrictive as Article 17 of the Jamaica
treaty, and neither of these treaties has been ratified by the Senate.96 In
93 - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10206, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) at 4386Q.
94 United States-Trinidad and Tobago Convention, supra note 76, 22 U.S.T. at 180, T.I.A.S.
No. 7047, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATiES (CCH) 7608 at 7624.
95 United States-Jamaica Convention, supra note 93, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10206, re-
printed in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCII) 4386 at 4386Q.
96 On July 23, 1982, the United States signed a new tax treaty with New Zealand. Convention
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, July 23, 1982, United
States-New Zealand, S. Treaty Doc. No. 27, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. v (1982). Article 16 of that treaty
is a limitation of benefits provision which uses the seventy-five percent beneficial interest owner-
ship text. On August 6, 1982, the United States signed a new tax treaty with Australia. Conven-
tion for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Aug. 6, 1982, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 28, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. v (1982). Article 16 of that treaty, which is the same as
Article 16 of the New Zealand treaty except for some minor grammatical changes, also employs
the seventy-five percent standard. Article 16 states:
(I) A person (other than an individual) which is a resident of one of the Contracting
States shall not be entitled under this convention to relief from taxation in the other Con-
tracting State unless:
(a) more than 75 percent of the beneficial interest in such person (or in the case of a
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addition, none of the countries subject to these strict provisions has
been classified by the Treasury Department as a tax haven.97 Since
treaty shopping involving non-tax haven countries is minimal, the ef-
fect of these new strict provisions on treaty shopping will be minimal.
These provisions do serve to signal tax haven countries that the
Treasury Department has recognized the problem as significant and is
willing to take actions to prevent it. The inclusion of the strict provi-
sions also gave the Treasury Department an opportunity to refine the
terms of the provision before attempting to include it in a treaty with a
tax haven. It remains to be seen whether the Treasury Department will
move quickly to capitalize on this experience and pressure a tax haven
to accept a strict limitation of benefits provision.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ANTI-TREATY SHOPPING
PROPOSALS
Historically, the Treasury Department's efforts to restrict treaty
shopping have focused largely on the inclusion of anti-treaty shopping
provisions in treaties.98 As shown previously, these efforts have been
governed by a number of considerations including the political stability
of treaty partners99 and the United States' balance-of-payments posi-
tion."° Political and economic fluctuations have inhibited the Treas-
company, more than 75 percent of the number of each class of the company's shares) is
owned, directly or indirectly, by any combination of one or more of:
(i) individuals who are residents of the United States;
(ii) citizens of the United States;
(iii) individuals who are residents of Australia;
(iv) companies as described in sub-paragraph (b); and
(v) the Contracting States;
(b) it is a company in whose principal class of shares there is substantial and regu-
lar trading on a recognized stock exchange in one of the Contracting States; or
(c) the establishment, acquisition and maintenance of such person and the conduct
of its operations did not have as one of its principal purposes the purpose of obtaining
benefits under the Convention.
(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(b), the term "a recognized stock exchange"
includes, in relation to the United States, the NASDAQ system owned by the National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(3) Where:
(a) income derived by a trustee is to be treated for the purposes of this Convention
as income of a resident of one of the Contracting States; and
(b) the trustee derived the income in connection with a scheme a principal pur-
pose of which was to obtain benefit under this Convention,
then, notwithstanding any other provision of this Convention, the convention does not apply
in relation to that income.
97 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 42-98.
99 Surrey, Factors affecting U.S. Treasury in conducting international tax treaties, 28 J. oF
TAX'N 277 (1968).
100 Id Addressing the issue of tax treaties with less developed countries, Surrey states:
[l]n making accommodations to international standards and joining in treaties these [Latin
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ury Department's ability to develop a consistent policy regarding the
emphasis to be placed on anti-treaty shopping efforts and the means to
restrict treaty shopping once goals had been set. A noteworthy exam-
ple of this inconsistency is the different approaches used in the Nether-
lands Antilles and Luxembourg treaties.101
Having demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Treasury Depart-
ment's past approach to restricting treaty shopping, the second issue to
be addressed is the effectiveness of the major anti-treaty shopping
measures thus far proposed. Five methods for general prevention have
been suggested.1 2 These approaches are: (1) termination of income
tax treaties with tax havens; (2) source country taxation; (3) treaty pro-
visions aimed at excluding certain entities (e.g. holding companies)
from benefits under the treaty; (4) second withholding tax; and (5) leg-
islative revisions of the Code.
A. Termination of Tax Treaties
In the most drastic of the alternatives proposed, the United States
would terminate all present treaties with tax havens and refuse to sign
future treaties with any existing or potential tax havens.10 3 Although
this extreme remedy has many possible negative side effects, the Treas-
ury Department adopted this approach in 1983 by announcing that it
would cancel income tax treaties with eighteen former British colonies
as of January 1, 1984.104
Many tax haven countries have come to depend on the strong in-
flow of foreign investment as major factors in their economies. It can
be argued that the United States never intended to provide through
American] countries want the industrialized countries to take some step representing an en-
couragement to investment by their taxpayers in the Latin American countries. Encouraging
trade and investment is the objective of tax treaties in general; but for these developing coun-
tries, this objective takes on a more urgent meaning.
Id at 278. See also supra text accompanying note 54.
101 See supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
102 See generally TAX HAvENs, supra note 4. By comparison, some suggestions deal only with
limited facets of the treaty shopping problem, such as personal service companies employing art-
ists, entertainers or athletes. The Treasury Department's June 16, 1981 Model Income Tax Treaty
contains an article specifically directed to limiting benefits for "Artistes and Athletes" (Article 17).
There is still room for abuse in this area, however, due in large part to flexibility remaining in
characterizing income (e.g. royalties versus business income). The suggestions mentioned above
are concerned primarily with developing more detailed definitions of income, thus leaving less
room for the exercise of discretion by the taxpayer. Id at 174-75.
103 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 170.
104 Wall St. J., July 6, 1983, at 1, col. 5 (Midwest ed.). The 18 countries are: Anguilla, Barba-
dos, Belize, Burundi, Dominica, Falklands, Gambia, Grenada, Malawi, Montserrat, Rwanda, St.
Christopher, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Zaire, and Zambia. See also supra
note 21.
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treaties the means by which these "financial industries" could flourish.
Nevertheless, the existence of these industries and the dependence of
many tax haven countries on these industries for their continued well
being weigh against any United States action which would have a neg-
ative effect on their financial stability and economic development.
Moreover, because many tax havens are undeveloped Latin American
countries, the United States has been interested in encouraging their
economic development as a means of improving United States export
trade. 105
A recent example which has received widespread attention is the
United States income tax treaty with the Netherlands Antilles."° The
United States has entered into negotiations with the Netherlands Antil-
les government to produce a new income tax treaty which will curtail
much of the tax avoidance occurring under the present treaty. The
Netherlands Antilles government, which estimates that it receives fifty
million dollars each year from foreign investment activity, argues that a
drastic tightening or termination of treaty provisions could severely
damage the country, possibly leading to an overthrow of the govern-
ment.107 While undoubtedly such claims are exaggerated, the Treasury
Department must take into account the potential ramifications of ter-
mination. Since the Netherlands Antilles serves as a conduit both for
extensive investment in the United States by foreign corporations, and
for United States corporations raising capital abroad, 108 any political
instability could have a severe negative impact on domestic financial
operations.
Alternatively, restructuring or terminating the tax treaty with the
Netherlands Antilles could serve as an example to other tax havens. If
the United States does not take a firm position with a notorious tax
haven such as the Netherlands Antilles, the governments of other tax
havens may be less inclined to cooperate with the United States during
treaty negotiations. Treaty shopping flourishes when there are signifi-
cant differences among tax treaties; therefore the United States' failure
to include strict limitation articles in treaties with even a few tax havens
could severely hamper future efforts to restrict treaty shopping.
105 Surrey, supra note 100.
106 The Netherlands Antilles is ranked third by the IRS in terms of United States gross income
paid to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. TAx HAVENS, supra note 4, at 177. Its popu-
lation, however, is only 245,000 and it has few natural resources. Fialka, supra note 18, at 1, col. 6.
107 Harold Henriquez, former tax commissioner of the Netherlands Antilles and its chief nego-
tiator during the treaty talks, has cautioned that increased treaty restrictions could lead to a gov-
ernment overthrow by groups with "leftist sympathies." Fialka, supra note 18, at 1, col. 6.
108 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4.
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While terminating the United States tax treaty with the Nether-
lands Antilles could have a major negative impact on the United States
financial market, terminating a treaty with one of the minor havens
should result in less severe ramifications. Terminating such a treaty
could have a major impact on the tax haven, however, if it results in a
decline of investments channelled through the country. The tax haven
might, therefore, be more accommodating towards inclusion of some
anti-abuse provisions in its treaty if it could still derive some benefit
from being a party to the treaty.
B. Source Country Taxation
The tax treaties to which the United States is a party are designed
to give the country where the taxpayer resides the primary right of tax-
ation. Thus, if an investor resides in Luxembourg but receives her in-
come in the form of dividends from a United States corporation, the
United States-Luxembourg income tax treaty gives Luxembourg the
first right of taxation."° The investor receives a tax credit from the
United States for any such tax paid." 0
Under the source country taxation proposal,' 1 ' the United States
would have the first right of taxation in the above example. This would
significantly reduce treaty shopping as income would be taxed under
the regular rates in the source country (the United States) for that type
of income, as opposed to the present low or nonexistent tax rates avail-
able in tax havens. The treaty would only affect the tax by providing a
tax credit for residents of one contracting state paying tax in the other
contracting state. Since lower tax rates would not be available under
the treaty and the credit would only benefit residents, the incentive to
abuse the treaty would be eliminated." 2
While this suggestion appears to be generally workable, one major
hurdle to its adoption is the potential negative effect on the balance-of-
payments position. If a treaty provision could affect investor decisions
so as to increase the United States balance-of-payments deficit, there is
109 United States-Luxembourg Convention, supra note 16, art. XV, 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S.
2355, reprinted in 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 5318.
110 I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (1976) states:
(a) GENERAL RULE-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following taxes
shall be allowed as a deduction for the taxable year within which paid or accrued:
(3) State and local, and foreign, income, war profits, and excess profits taxes.
1 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 171.
112 See generally U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Manual for
the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/94 at 66-73 (1979).
Income Tax Treaty Shopping
5:626(1983)
likely to be strong resistance to ratification of the treaty. The United
States balance-of-payments deficit will tend to be increased to the ex-
tent that capital investment which flows from the treaty country into
the United States is less than capital investment, made by United States
investors, which flows from the treaty country to other parts of the
world.1 3 In view of the present state of the United States economy,
such a deficit would present a political liability which no administra-
tion would want to incur.1 1 4 Further, the continued existence of one or
more tax havens with favorable tax treaties would defeat any changes
made in other treaties, as investors would simply change the country
through which they channel funds.
C. Exclusionary Treaty Artiqles
Suggestions in the area of exclusionary treaty articles generally
center on improving the effectiveness of Article 16. As described above
in the overviews of past and present versions of Article 16, attempts to
improve its effectiveness have not met with great success.'1 5 The pro-
posals concentrate on increasing the necessary percentage of domestic
ownership in a corporation and reducing the amount of passive income
a company may receive while remaining eligible for treaty benefits.'
1 6
Changes in these variables continue to meet with some limited success,
but it is now obvious the existence of an "Article 16" in a treaty is not
sufficient to prevent third-country residents from taking advantage of
the treaty." 7 To the extent such an article will not conflict with other
anti-abuse measures and can still provide a limiting effect, however, the
United States should include it as part of a package approach to han-
dling the problem.
D. Second Withholding Tax
The concept of a second withholding tax refers to a tax on pay-
ments of dividends or interest by a holding company to its sharehold-
ers. Also known as a tax on secondary liability payments, it was briefly
considered earlier in the discussion of the differences between the
Netherlands Antilles Protocol of 1963 and the United States-Luxem-
bourg treaty."' United States income tax treaties generally contain
113 For an explanation of balance-of-payments accounting, see D. EITEMAN & A. STONEHILL,
MULTINATIONAL BusINEss FNANCE 76-89 (3d ed. 1982).
114 See supra text accompanying note 54.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 69-98.
116 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 171-72.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
118 Id
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provisions in which the United States agrees not to impose a tax on
dividends and interest paid to shareholders by a foreign corporation
receiving United States source income. 19 An agreement by the United
States not to impose a tax on secondary liability is an important benefit
to third-country residents taking advantage of a United States tax
treaty, but does not provide any significant advantage to the residents
of the tax haven. 2 Residents of the tax haven will be taxed by their
country on distributions by the holding company. Since third-country
residents will not be taxed in either contracting state, their income can
be effectively taxed only if the tax is imposed on the distribution before
it reaches them. If the waiver of secondary liability tax provisions were
removed from the treaties, treaty shopping could be inhibited.
A legislative approach suggested for partially dealing with this
problem is the imposition of a withholding tax on the United States
branch of a foreign corporation.' 2 ' According to the IRS, "a tax equal
to the withholding tax imposed on fixed and determinable United
States source income would be imposed on the branch when it remits
income to its foreign office."' 122 The tax on United States source in-
come could be determined relatively easily. In addition, the withhold-
ing tax would be administered by United States tax officials rather than
foreign tax officials. Provisions could be made to waive this tax if the
foreign country is not a tax haven; this waiver then would serve as an
incentive for countries not to seek tax haven status.
E. Internal Revenue Code Revisions
The final major approach suggested for preventing treaty shopping
119 In many cases the tax haven does impose a tax on dividends and interest paid by resident
corporations of the tax haven to nonresident shareholders. In those cases where the tax haven
imposes such a tax, usually at a very low rate, the United States does not have the right to impose
a tax on the secondary liability. It is only when there is no second withholding tax that the waiver
issue arises. See, e.g., PRICE WATERHOUSE, INFORMATION GUIDE: DOING BUSINESS IN THE
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 30 (Oct. 1979) ("[n]o withholding taxes on dividends and interest paid
to foreign shareholders by a Netherlands Antilles corporation"); PRICE WATERHOUSE, INFORMA-
TION GUIDE: DOING BUSINESS IN THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG 64 (Mar. 1977) ("Hold-
ing companies do not deduct withholding tax on dividends or bond interest paid.").
120 The third-country resident already has limited the amount of United States tax he or she
must pay on income by forming a corporation in a country party to a United States tax treaty,
which country imposes a low rate of tax on passive income. In addition, the country imposes no
tax on distributions by resident corporations to nonresident shareholders. If the United States
agrees not to impose any secondary liability tax, the third-country resident is able to accept divi-
dends from his or her foreign corporation without paying United States tax. See also supra text
accompanying notes 7-12.
121 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 176.
122 Id
Income Tax Treaty Shopping
5:626(1983)
is to revise portions of the Code so as to provide less disparity between
United States tax laws and certain provisions in the laws of tax
havens.123 One proposal is to reduce the thirty percent rate124 imposed
on passive income to foreign investors. The lower the tax rate, the less
the incentive to avoid it. Proponents argue that the treaties generally
reduce this rate anyway so that a reduction in the statutory rate is not a
novel idea."2 Reduction of the statutory rate and elimination of treaty
provisions which reduce that rate would place foreign investors on
roughly the same footing regardless of their country of residence. Since
all countries would be subject to the same rate, there could be no treaty
shopping for a rate decrease. In fact, it has been suggested that if a
country was deemed to be an undesirable tax haven in other respects,
the tax rate could be set higher to serve as a disincentive for channel-
ling funds through the haven.126 It seems unlikely, however, that it
would be possible to fine tune tax rates by setting different rates for
each country.
The disadvantages of legislative treatment of the problem arise
from the limited flexibility in amending the Code as compared to the
extensive flexibility in negotiating treaties. A better match between
United States tax laws and the tax laws of a foreign country can be
achieved if done through treaty negotiations rather than applying a
statutory rate based on some average. In addition, Treasury Depart-
ment negotiators can take into consideration other factors when negoti-
ating a treaty which may affect the United States' willingness to match
the foreign country's tax rates. This is the possible disincentive effect
described above."2 7
An anti-abuse section has been suggested as an addition to the
Code.128 Such a section would permit the IRS to withhold treaty bene-
fits when persons who were not intended to be beneficiaries of a treaty
sought to take advantage of it. Also, it could permit the IRS to act on
new forms of abuse not contemplated when the treaty was written. A
section such as this, coupled with the new jurisdiction provided in Sec-
123 TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 175.
124 LR.C. § 871 & 881 (1981).
125 TAX HAVENs, supra note 4, at 175. For example, if the tax rate were set at 15% on United
States source dividends, interest and royalties paid to nonresident aliens and foreign corporations,
and the United States wanted to direct investment away from the Netherlands Antilles, the tax
rate could be set at 30% for residents of that country.
126 See TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 175.
127 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
128 See TAX HAVENS, supra note 4, at 176.
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tion 7701(a), 129 might be very effective, but it would significantly in-
crease the cost of administering benefits under a treaty. In general,
legislative approaches to the treaty shopping problem should be viewed
cautiously; activity in the area of foreign relations should be left to the
executive branch.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the 1930s, the United States has entered into income tax
treaties involving more than forty countries and fifteen territories.
During that time, however, the United States has not developed an ef-
fective means to prevent third-country residents from abusing United
States bilateral income tax treaties. The most significant development
to date has been the "Investment or Holding Company" (or "Limita-
tion of Benefits") article included in many treaties. As was demon-
strated earlier, 130 this provision has had little success in preventing
treaty shopping.
Recently, the concern about treaty shopping has increased as mod-
em developments in the practice of international tax law have made
the benefits of treaty shopping more available to sophisticated inves-
tors. This increased concern has prompted several suggestions as to
techniques for curtailing treaty shopping, but none of these suggestions
has yet emerged with a dominant backing.
Rather than choosing one technique to use in fighting treaty shop-
ping, a more effective approach, and one with a higher chance of suc-
cess, would be to combine several of the techniques. Thus, including a
limitation of benefits article in each new treaty or supplementary agree-
ment would permit the Treasury Department some flexibility in design-
ing the terms of the article so as to be most effective when working in
combination with the laws of each particular nation. Any provisions
concerning enforcement should be enacted as legislative additions to
the Code. This will provide greater uniformity in enforcement under
the various treaties and supplemental agreements, and will allow Con-
gress to maintain uniformity in the many Code enforcement provisions.
Certainly the most important area in which to achieve this uniformity
is in the applicable rate structures. Even a slight difference between
treaty rates will serve as an incentive for investors to establish a resi-
dent corporation in the state with the most favorable rate.
Finally, an article should be added to every treaty now being ne-
129 I.R.C. § 7701(a) (1982) (enacted as part of TEFRA). See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
130 See text following note 42.
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gotiated which designates what actions are to be taken when abuse is
uncovered and allocates enforcement duties between the United States
and its treaty partners. If the other contracting states share the risk of
financial losses by allowing treaty shopping to continue, there will be
an incentive for those states to cooperate with IRS agents in uncovering
abuse. For example, disclosure laws in foreign states which would re-
quire corporations to reveal their percentage of foreign ownership
(though not necessarily the names of those owners) with a provision for
noncompliance, would be helpful.
While adoption of these recommendations alone will not ensure
the abolition of treaty shopping activity, they will most likely diminish
the chances of successful tax avoidance through treaty shopping and
make the risks associated with failure so high that it will no longer be a
recommended tax planning method. In the long run, this will accom-
plish the result sought by the IRS.
.Kenneth A. Grady
